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Abstract
In recent scholarship the spiritual reading of the New Testament resurrection
stories has come under pressure from new studies of the relevant data. In
this article, two of the most conspicuous of these studies are compared and
evaluated. First, Richard Swinburne’s monograph opens our eyes to the fact that,
in interpreting the resurrection stories, much more is at stake than is usually
recognised in so-called ‘undogmatic’ exegesis. However, the rather crude way
in which Swinburne deals with these stories, suggesting that they represent Jesus’
resurrection as a bare fact not qualitatively different from other historical facts,
neglects their peculiarity and displays insufficient hermeneutical sensitivity for
their unique theological meaning. Second, Tom Wright’s monumental volume
is sometimes criticised for a similar single-minded focus on historical questions
and a concomitant lack of attention to the eschatological character of Jesus’
resurrection. As a result, George Hunsinger has argued, it becomes unclear
why the resurrection reports embody life-transforming good news now. Close
scrutiny of Wright’s book, however, does not vindicate this criticism. Wright
neither isolates the question of the resurrection’s historicity from its theological
meanings nor overlooks the fact that a plausible historical case for the resurrection
does not in itself elicit faith. Still, he rightly argues that what people believe
about what actually has happened often plays a vital role in their personal
transformation. Moreover, the eschatological nature of the resurrection does not
rule out the fact that it can be seen and discussed with integrity as a historical
issue.
Introduction
Make no mistake: if He rose at all
it was as His body;
if the cells’ dissolution did not reverse, the molecules
reknit, the amino acids rekindle,
the Church will fall.
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Let us not mock God with metaphor,
analogy, sidestepping transcendence;
making of the event a parable, a sign painted in the
faded credulity of earlier ages:
let us walk through the door.’1
These are two of John Updike’s seven ‘stanzas at Easter’, famous for their
rigorously material way of representing the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Of course the poem is just that – a poem, not a theological treatise in
disguise. That being conceded, it is nevertheless interesting to see what
it aims at theologically. Clearly, the poem voices a resuscitation view of
the resurrection which may strike us as crude, highly disturbing and even
offensive. Where in the New Testament do we find the resurrection depicted
in such a vividly realistic way as in the first of these stanzas? Clearly, the
New Testament reports are consistent in not portraying the resurrection as
a kind of reversal of natural biochemical processes, but as a transformation
into a new kind of existence, characterised by a physicality which displays
both continuity and discontinuity with our present physicality. At the same
time, however, we intuitively feel that Updike has a point. If we are to
think about the resurrection with integrity, we cannot escape thinking about
it in its concrete materiality. For clearly, sheer analogy and parable can
hardly bear the weight of real hope which springs from the resurrection
stories.
But can we still subscribe to such a ‘realist’ view of the resurrection,
given the host of old and new objections that have been and are being put
forward against it? Or to put this question in a more open way: can we speak
with intellectual and theological integrity on the resurrection of Christ today,
and if so how? In this article I will explore this question by comparing the
different answers given to it in two recent thought-provoking monographs,
namely Richard Swinburne’s original The Resurrection of God Incarnate and Tom
Wright’s monumental The Resurrection of the Son of God (both dating from
2003).2 These books are only two specimens of a host of present-day studies
reappropriating this fairly traditional theme. Leaving aside all sorts of other
publications, I counted on average one volume with collected academic
papers on the resurrection-theme each year during the past decade – most
1 John Updike, ‘Seven Stanzas at Easter’, first published in The Christian Century 78 (1961),
p. 236; later included in e.g. Telephone Poles and Other Poems (New York: Knopf, 1963).
2 Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003); N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Christian Origins and the Question of God,
vol. 3) (London: SPCK, 2003).
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of them (also) focusing on the resurrection of Christ.3 Whether or not a
common denominator or general tendency can be distinguished in current
resurrection research is hard to say. It seems, however, that the view which
for a long time counted as the ‘standard view’ (at least among academics,
although not among ordinary believers) is coming under increasing pressure.
The standard view on resurrection comprises at least the following four
theses:
(1) In the opaque context of Jewish Hellenism at the beginning of the first
century ‘resurrection’ could mean many different things.
(2) One of the earliest and most influential Christian writers, Paul, did not
believe in physical resurrection, but had a more ‘spiritual’ view.
(3) Early Christian resurrection language was originally used to express the
view that Jesus after his death was exalted into heaven in some special
way; only subsequently it became conflated with more literalist views,
as appearing e.g. in the empty tomb stories.
(4) Given the current scientific worldview, it is undeniable that whatever
happened to Jesus’ body, it was not ‘raised from the dead’ as the gospels
suggest (at least when read at face value).4
Whether or not this view is indeed losing its sway, it is in any case
severely criticised by such mutually different accounts as those of Swinburne
and Wright (as well as a couple of others). In discussing these accounts, I
will not go into detail, but concentrate exclusively on the structure of their
respective arguments. I will first have a closer look at Swinburne’s approach
to the matter.
3 Paul Avis (ed.), The Resurrection of Jesus Christ (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1993);
Stephen Barton and Graham Stanton (eds), Resurrection: Essays in Honour of Leslie Houlden
(London: SPCK, 1994); A. Bommarius (ed.), Fand die Auferstehung wirklich statt? Eine
Diskussion mit Gerd Lu¨demann (Du¨sseldorf: Parerga, 1995); Gavin D’Costa (ed.), Resurrection
Reconsidered (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1996); Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendall and
Gerald O’Collins (eds), The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); R. N. Longenecker (ed.), Life in the Face of Death:
The Resurrection Message of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998); Stanley E.
Porter, Michael A. Hayes and David Tombs, Resurrection (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1999); R. Tacelli and P. Copan (eds), Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000); Friedrich Avemarie and Hermann Lichtenberger
(eds), Auferstehung – Resurrection: The Fourth Durham–Tu¨bingen Research Symposium (Tu¨bingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2001); R. Bieringer, V. Koperski and B. Lataire (eds), Resurrection in the
New Testament (Leuven: Peeters, 2002); Ted Peters, Robert J. Russell and Michael Welker
(eds), Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002).
4 See, for a slightly more elaborated description of this ‘dominant paradigm’, Wright,
Resurrection, p. 7.
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Richard Swinburne: intellectual and theological decency?
Richard Swinburne is of course well-known for his inductive ‘strictly
scientific’ approach to numerous problems in philosophical theology. Thus,
he can hardly be suspected of being a biblicist or fundamentalist; he does not
even assign some a priori kind of special authority to the biblical scriptures
at all. Surprisingly or not, however, quite often his conclusions come very
close to the conclusions of those who do believe all kinds of things ‘because
the Bible says so’. For example, already in 1979 Swinburne argued that when
we evaluate all relevant data and considerations as fairly as possible, it is more
probable than not that God exists.5 Now in his 2003 book Swinburne applies
his inductive method to the questions and problems which beset traditional
Christian resurrection belief. From the very first sentence Swinburne makes
clear that his special interest concerns an inquiry into the ‘core physical
element’ of the resurrection of Jesus. He defends this focus by arguing that any
universal (cosmic or theological) significance the resurrection might have,
although going infinitely far beyond its physical element, does nevertheless
depend upon it. ‘To initiate the redemption of humanity and of the natural
order, [God] needs to bring to life a previously damaged body, not only a
soul.’6 That is why Swinburne specifies this physical aspect as the core element
of resurrection belief.
Given this central emphasis, it is remarkable that Swinburne devotes only
a third part of his book to the ordinary questions relating to the exegesis
of the Easter stories in the New Testament. His argument for giving only
scant attention to these fountainheads of Christian resurrection belief is as
follows. According to Swinburne there are some important other issues
which influence our evaluations in exegesis and biblical theology, but which
are rarely if ever made explicit. It is these issues that Swinburne wants to sort
out first, because the relative weight we have to attach to the resurrection
reports depends upon how we deal with these preliminary issues. These
preliminary issues concern first of all the general background evidence for
the resurrection. For example, when it is improbable that there is a God
who can miraculously intervene in the course of things, it is all the more
improbable that this God raised Jesus from the dead. When, on the other
hand, the general evidence suggests that such a God does exist, then it is
important to assess whether this God might have a good reason to bring
about the resurrection of Jesus. Such a reason can only be found by looking
5 Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979; rev. edn 1991); cf. its
popularised version Is there a God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
6 Swinburne, Resurrection, p. 1 (numbers in parentheses in the text in this section refer to
pages in this book).
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carefully at the sort of life Jesus led and at what he taught. Therefore, second,
Swinburne takes into account what he calls the prior historical evidence for
the resurrection. Of course New Testament scholars also study this material,
but usually they do not consider it relevant to the issue whether or not the
resurrection occurred (p. 3). This is a serious mistake, Swinburne argues. For
when we have reason to suppose that the life of Jesus is the sort of life which
God might resurrect, we will need less detailed posterior historical evidence,
i.e. evidence from texts about what happened after the death of Jesus.
Therefore, only after having discussed the general background evidence
and the prior historical evidence, Swinburne turns to the traditional material:
the exegesis of the New Testament reports on Jesus’ resurrection. By making
this detour, Swinburne prevents hidden theological commitments from
playing an unacknowledged role in the formation of our judgement. It seems
to me that Swinburne rightly castigates those New Testament scholars who
contend that they examine their subject matter without any prior theological
claims. For whether we decide in the end that the resurrection reports are
trustworthy or not depends to a large extent on whether we think that
such an extraordinary event as the resurrection could have occurred at all
and, if so, whether in the case of Jesus there were good reasons for such a
‘super-miracle’ (p. 4). Therefore, we need to put our views concerning these
preliminary issues on the table in advance (p. 3).
In this context Swinburne spells out a couple of reasons (connected with
human sin and suffering) which God might have for becoming incarnate,
and sketches the sort of perfect earthly life an incarnate God would live. He
then goes on to argue that in all human history there was no (religious)
figure except Jesus whose life satisfied these requirements.7 Swinburne also
thinks that God, in order to make us believe that some particular person
is God Incarnate (so that we can associate with this person), must provide
a kind of divine signature on this person’s life by means of some super-
miracle. Such a miracle must be understood by the contemporaries as God’s
authenticating approval of that person’s life (p. 62). A resurrection would
of course be a superb instantiation of the required sort of super-miracle. All
in all, therefore, there is a significant prior probability that God would raise
Jesus from the dead. Now I will short-circuit the exact course of Swinburne’s
argument and jump to his conclusion, which is as follows. Given that it is not
improbable that God exists – Swinburne modestly estimates this probability
7 It is possible for Swinburne to do this in a more or less fair and unbiased way, since
no comparable claims concerning sin and suffering as motives for an incarnation are
being made in connection with any of the more serious alternative candidates (e.g.
Muhammad, the Buddha, etc.).
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at 50 per cent – and given what we know about the concrete biography
of Jesus compared to that of other religious leaders, the probability that
Jesus, being God Incarnate, was raised from the dead, calculated by means of
Bayes’ theorem, is approximately 97 per cent (p. 214). Or to put this in more
domestic terms: if you don’t judge the existence of God highly improbable,
you have every reason to believe that this God raised Jesus from the dead.
Even if we would estimate the relevant probabilities somewhat lower, it still
remains true that it is more probable than not that God became incarnate in
Jesus and that Jesus was resurrected. In short, therefore, we can speak with
perfect intellectual integrity about the bodily resurrection of Christ today.
But is this true? In a review of Swinburne’s book, the atheist philosopher
Michael Martin raises quite a number of objections against Swinburne’s
argument.8 First, he questions the reasons Swinburne ascribes to God for
becoming incarnate. If, for example, it was appropriate that God came to
share our human sufferings by becoming incarnate, why did it take so long
before the incarnation occurred? Second, Martin disputes the claim that
Jesus is the only proper candidate for being an incarnation of God. For did
Jesus really lead such a morally perfect life? What about his tacit approval of
slavery, or the harsh punishments he inflicted on the wicked in the afterlife?9
Third, Martin’s interpretation of the posterior historical material differs from
Swinburne’s. For example, when it comes to the empty tomb, what historical
accuracy do the traditional stories have? ‘Given Roman crucifixion customs,
the prior probability that Jesus was buried is low.’10 It is much more plausible
that Jesus was buried anonymously in a common grave.
At this point I interrupt my rendering of this discussion, and make
a general observation. It seems that with this sort of discussion between
Swinburne and Martin we are back in the times of Celsus and Origen. But is
it really the case that we have not made any advance, e.g. in hermeneutics,
since those times? The arguments adduced by both Swinburne and Martin
undeniably display a certain coarseness and vulgarity. It is suggested that in
the Christian faith the resurrection of Jesus counts as a bare historical fact not
qualitatively different from other historical facts. This raises the question as to
whether Swinburne and Martin speak with sufficient theological decency about
the resurrection of Christ. It seems that both neglect the peculiar strangeness
of the New Testament resurrection stories, as well as the specific theological
8 Michael Martin, review of Swinburne’s Resurrection of God Incarnate, Religious Studies 40
(2004), pp. 367–70.
9 Ibid., p. 369.
10 Ibid., p. 370.
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meanings attached to the resurrection in the scriptures.11 Neither Swinburne
nor Martin seems to have noticed that ordinary human language is in a sense
warped and distorted by the inconceivability of the new reality which came
to light at Easter – an eschatological reality that cannot easily be grasped, but
only hinted at in a groping way. It seems that we must be more sensitive to
the fact that in the New Testament the glory of the resurrected Christ subverts
our familiar metaphysics, ‘upsets our worldviews of what is possible, shatters
the “glamour of violence” that blinds us, and sets in its place the splendour
of the truth of God’s reconciliation and peace realized in Jesus Christ’.12
In brief, as a theologian I accept from Swinburne that in interpreting the
resurrection stories much more is at stake than is usually recognised in so-
called ‘undogmatic’ exegesis and/or biblical theology. However, Swinburne
might in turn learn from biblical theologians and others to listen carefully
to the scriptures in the first place, rather than simply to consider these as
suppliers of answers to our own preconceived questions. Let us now examine
whether Wright proceeds more cautiously in this respect.
Tom Wright: intellectual and theological decency?
Wright’s answer to his leading question (‘What happened at Easter
morning?’) is embedded in what is probably the most comprehensive
historical study of all relevant textual material thus far.13 Wright not
only examines virtually all early Jewish and Christian texts that somehow
relate to the notion of resurrection, but also surveys views on death and
afterlife in the pagan ancient world. His book has already been hailed
as ‘a magnificent contribution to an enterprise of singular excellence and
significance for modern biblical study, theology and the church’.14 Coming
to the New Testament, Wright attempts to establish, by means of detailed
analyses and in discussion with many biblical scholars, that the standard
interpretation of the resurrection reports is misguided. According to Wright,
careful scrutiny shows that Paul understood Jesus’ comeback at Easter in
terms of a bodily resurrection, that the empty tomb tradition goes back
11 A fine example of a study uncovering the theological meanings of the resurrection
stories (without denying their referential intentions) is Peter Selby, Look for the Living:
The Corporate Nature of Resurrection Faith (London: SCM Press, 1976), esp. pp. 82–125.
12 Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding, 2nd edn (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2004), p. 193; Migliore is inspired here by David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 349, 389.
13 See also, however, Alan F. Segal, Life After Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Religions
(New York: Doubleday, 2004); both volumes exceed 800 pp.
14 Stephen N. Williams, ‘The Resurrection of the Son of God’, International Journal of Systematic
Theology 6 (2004), p. 421.
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to the earliest post paschal times rather than being a later invention, that
the gospel writers considered Jesus’ resurrection as a real historical event
(although a unique one), etc. As in Swinburne, the significance of the
mutual discrepancies between the gospel reports on the resurrection is
minimised; these discrepancies are largely what might be expected given such
an extraordinary event and reflect only minimal adjustments and theological
elaboration. ‘The very strong historical probability is that, when Matthew,
Luke and John describe the risen Jesus, they are writing down very early oral
tradition, representing three different ways in which the original astonished
participants told the stories.’15
Next, Wright wonders how it was possible that the earliest Christians were
so confident that Jesus was raised from the dead. He suggests that all details
point in one direction here: they must have considered the traditions con-
cerning the empty tomb and the appearances of the risen Lord as historically
credible. These traditions, in turn, can only be reasonably explained by the ac-
tual bodily resurrection of Jesus. Alternative explanations are less convincing,
because they have less puzzle-solving capacity (to use the Kuhnian phrase),
e.g. when it comes to clarifying the rise of Christianity. Along such historical
and hermeneutical lines, Wright ultimately arrives at conclusions which are
largely similar to those of Swinburne. His concluding formulations reflect
in a sense Swinburne’s approximation of 97 per cent. So the two studies
under review form complementary (and only to some extent overlapping)
challenges to the standard view and affirm the notion of bodily resurrection.
The crucial question, however, is whether Wright, with his strong his-
toriographic interest, does not succumb to the same temptation Swinburne
yielded to, namely a lack of attention to the anomalous and inconceivable (or
in theological terms, the eschatological) character of Jesus’ resurrection. In-
deed, this is what George Hunsinger has recently put forward against Wright’s
position.16 Hunsinger distinguishes three main approaches that have been
taken towards Christ’s resurrection in contemporary theology: a spiritual ap-
proach, taking the resurrection primarily as a symbol of spiritual regeneration
(as in Schleiermacher and Bultmann), an eschatological one, which emphas-
ises that the unique, transcendent character of the resurrection makes it elude
historical grasp (endorsed by Moltmann, Frei and Hunsinger himself), and a
15 Wright, Resurrection of the Son of God, p. 611 (Mark is left out here because his eight-verse
ending does not bring the risen Jesus on stage, p. 608).
16 George Hunsinger, ‘The Daybreak of the New Creation: Christ’s Resurrection in Recent
Theology’, Scottish Journal of Theology 57 (2004), pp. 163–80. Similar suspicions can be
found in Williams, ‘Resurrection’, p. 430, and in Larry W. Hurtado, ‘Book of the
Month’, Expository Times (2003), p. 84.
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historical approach, which bases the Christian faith on Christ’s bodily resur-
rection as an actual historical occurrence. It is the latter view that Hunsinger
ascribes to Pannenberg and Tom Wright. In this connection he charges
Wright with focusing ‘so single-mindedly on historicity’ as to relegate
‘questions of transcendence to the margins, or at least to another day’.17 As a
result, despite his ‘enormously learned and significant body of work’, Wright
leaves obscure how his historical conclusions are actually related to faith.18
It seems to me, however, that a close reading of Wright’s book reveals this
criticism to be overstated, to say the least. For, unlike Swinburne’s approach,
Wright’s position is free of naive evidentialism.19 Wright is fully aware that
the resurrection is about more than an empty tomb, and not just ‘a conjuring
trick with bones’ (as one of the few resurrection writers conspicuously absent
in Wright’s book, David Jenkins, caricatured the orthodox view20). He is not
so preoccupied with the many historical and literary questions surrounding
the Easter reports that ‘the question of why the resurrection should be good
news now almost disappears’ – a risk that is not always avoided, as Rowan
Williams has indicated.21 Wright, however, does not isolate the question of
the resurrection’s historicity from its theological meanings, and explicitly
discusses the relation between faith and history in this connection. The
only thing is that he comes to conclusions which are slightly different from
Hunsinger’s in this respect.
Wright elucidates his view of the relation between history and theology, or
in philosophical terms, immanence and transcendence, by opening his book
with a suggestive little parable, to which he returns at the final pages. It is
about a king who commanded his archers to shoot the sun. Understandably,
their zealous efforts to obey this command were in vain. Their arrows fell
short, and the sun remained unaffected. Then, however, the youngest of
them came to where the king sat before a pond in his garden. With a single
shot he pierced the place in the pond where the image of the sun was
reflected. The sun splintered into a thousand glittering fragments. In the
same way, all arrows of history cannot reach the transcendent God. Deep
inside the Christian tradition, however, lies a rumour that an image of the
one true God has appeared within the gravitational field of history. The
parable makes clear what, according to Wright, history can and cannot say
17 Hunsinger, ‘Daybreak of the New Creation’, p. 173.
18 Ibid., p. 172.
19 So rightly Williams, ‘Resurrection’, p. 429.
20 It is not easy to find Jenkins’s oft misquoted phrase in its original context; for a
somewhat later presentation of his views on the matter, see David E. Jenkins, God,
Miracle and the Church of England (London: SCM Press, 1987), pp. 3–39.
21 Rowan Williams, Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel, 2nd edn (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim,
2003), p. 110.
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about what happened at Easter. We cannot, by offering historical ‘proofs’
of the Easter event, demonstrate the existence of God or the validity of the
Christian message.22 But if Jesus (as the rumour has it) is God’s image on
earth, then history can touch what happened to him. Even his resurrection,
however earth-shattering, was an earthly event, and needed to be exactly
that because in it the Creator starts to reclaim his creation. As a result, it
had earthly consequences, including an empty tomb. So if the sun is truly
reflected in the pool, then to shoot the sun’s reflection in the water is to say
something about the ‘real world’ and the way God is present in it. It is this
real world that historians are committed to study. When in doing that they
run up against rumours about the resurrection, the water may become so
splashed and stirred that we can hardly see the image anymore. But this is just
what might be expected, given that the resurrection has to be understood
‘not as a bizarre miracle, but as the beginning of the new creation’.23
Strikingly, in this quotation Wright uses almost exactly the same phrase
which figures in Hunsinger’s title and which so neatly points to the
unique, eschatological character of the resurrection. So, clearly, Wright
does not deny this. His emphasis, however, is on the fact that the
disanalogous, eschatological character does not make historical inquiry
into the resurrection either impossible (as Bultmann and Troeltsch held)
or inappropriate (as Hunsinger, and beyond him Hans Frei and Karl Barth
suggest). When arguing for its appropriateness, Wright grants that to present
a plausible historical case for the resurrection (as he is attempting to do)
does not in itself elicit faith or transform our lives.24 Faith does not rest
upon a historical probability of approximately 97 per cent, but upon the
self-authenticating encounter with the living Christ in Word and Spirit.
However, Wright insists that this does not make historical investigation into
the resurrection event superfluous or inappropriate. Here he has a quarrel
with Hans Frei. Admittedly, in his all too brief discussion of Frei, Wright
misses the point that Frei does allow for the role of historical inquiry when it
comes to showing that the claim that Jesus rose from the dead has not been
disconfirmed. As Frei rightly saw, if this claim had been falsified, then there
would be nothing unique or eschatological about the resurrection at all.25
Unfortunately, however, Frei did not allow for a more positive role of
historical investigation in connection with the resurrection, because the
22 Wright, Resurrection, pp. 11–12.
23 Ibid., p. 737.
24 Ibid., p. 26. This point can be illustrated by the example of Jewish theologian Pinchas
Lapide, whose recognition of Jesus’ bodily resurrection as a historical fact did not turn
him into a Christian; see his Auferstehung. Ein ju¨disches Glaubenserlebnis (Stuttgart: Calwer
Verlag, 1977).
25 Cf. Hunsinger, ‘Daybreak’, pp. 176–7.
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transcendence of the object would elude historical grasp, and because
according to him the ‘fact claim’ about the risen Christ is inseparable from
our affirmation of his living presence.26 Now let us briefly examine both
these arguments in turn. First, the idea that the resurrection cannot be
confirmed historically because it eludes historical grasp seems to betray a
more or less positivist understanding of science. For surely nothing can be
proved or definitely confirmed here by establishing some causally closed
chain of events. That is not to say, however, that it is impossible to affirm
Jesus’ resurrection by means of inference to the best explanation. In fact,
that is what Wright is trying to do, and it is not clear what is wrong (or
inappropriate) with his approach.27
Second, according to the Barth–Frei–Hunsinger school, acknowledging
that Christ rose from the dead is inseparable from the affirmation of Christ’s
living presence. This suggests that one can only believe in the resurrection
when one is already a Christian, so that the resurrection cannot figure, for
example, as a subject worth raising in missionary encounters. It seems to
me, however, that we should not concede this point too easily. For surely
the connection between acknowledging Christ’s resurrection and affirming
his living presence may also work the other way round. That is, affirming
Christ as the living one cannot be separated from the ‘fact claim’, nor
isolated from historical considerations. ‘What people believe about what
actually has happened is often an extremely powerful element in human
transformation.’28 To put this in scholastic terms: although the fides historica is
not to be identified with the fides salvifica, that does not make the fides historica
meaningless from the perspective of faith.29 After all, already at Easter evening
Jesus’ disciple Thomas came to faith only after having been convinced that
Jesus really was raised from the dead (or so it is depicted in St John’s gospel).
And we are summoned to believe even if we have not personally encountered
(‘seen’) the living Christ.30
Wright further illustrates this point by indicating what happens when
people have become convinced that, as a matter of history, the resurrection
26 Hans Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1975), p. 147; cf. Hunsinger, ‘Daybreak’, p. 176. For an instructive
full-scale introduction to Frei’s theology, see Mike Higton, Christ, Providence and History:
Hans W. Frei’s Public Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2003).
27 Wright, Resurrection, p. 716; on the use of ‘inference to the best explanation’ in science
as well as in (philosophy of) religion: see Wilko van Holten, Explanation within the Bounds
of Religion (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003), pp. 133–42, 171–6.
28 Wright, Resurrection, p. 26
29 Pace Williams, ‘Resurrection’, pp. 430–1.
30 John 20:29.
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did not happen after all. Clearly, this new factual belief of theirs about what
historically is the case does not fail to influence and transform their way of life
in a variety of ways.31 We can imagine them, for example, developing other
emotions and moral attitudes, adapting their expectations of the future,
stopping going to church, etc. (of course, these things can also be cause
rather than effect, but it is not clear why there should be one-way traffic
here). Conversely, the transformational capacity of the resurrection stories
and the spiritual experience of Christ’s presence should not be disconnected
from the propositional statement (or factual belief, or referential claim, or
whatever) by means of which the resurrection is affirmed as a historical
event. In this sense, it seems to me that Wright is correct in arguing that,
despite the unique, eschatological character of the resurrection event, the
possibility and the relevance of ‘historical knowledge about the resurrection,
of a sort that can be discussed without presupposing Christian faith, cannot
be ruled out a priori’.32
Conclusion
I come to a twofold conclusion. First, in speaking about the resurrection of
Christ we should always keep in mind the strangeness surrounding the New
Testament resurrection reports, as well as the specific theological meanings
attached to it in the scriptures. As a result, the resurrection cannot be treated
with theological integrity as a historical fact not qualitatively different from
all others. In this sense, Swinburne’s approach to the matter is questionable,
to say the least.
Second, although the resurrection of Christ, as the inauguration of an
inconceivable new reality, is an extremely odd and anomalous occurrence
from a historical point of view, we can speak about it with intellectual and
theological decency as a historical event. Arguably, Christians even should speak
about it in this way, for reasons which have been excellently summarised by
Wright’s famous predecessor as a New Testament scholar, C. D. F. Moule:
‘A gospel which cares only for the apostolic proclamation and denies that it
either can or should be tested for its historical antecedents, is really only a
thinly veiled gnosticism or docetism and . . . will prove ultimately to be no
Gospel.’33 In this sense, we have reason to take with theological seriousness
the tenor of John Updike’s ‘Seven Stanzas at Easter’.
31 Wright, Resurrection, p. 26.
32 Ibid., p. 22.
33 C. D. F. Moule, The Phenomenon of the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1967), pp. 80–1
(as quoted in Wright, Resurrection, p. 23).
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